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THE CONSTITUTION AS MIRROR: TRIBE'S
CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES
Richard A. Posner*
CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES. By Laurence H. Tribe. Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1985. Pp. xiv, 458. $29.95.
This book of essays (some previously published) by a leading professor and practitioner of constitutional law argues, in effect and often
in words close to these, that the Constitution is what we want it to be
(hence "choices") and that what we should want it to be is the charter
of a radically egalitarian society. Professor Tribe acknowledges the
conventional constraints on judges' molding the Constitution to their
personal preferences, but none of those constraints (text, structure,
history, tradition, precedent) hampers him much. He makes the Constitution the mirror of his political preferences and criticizes the current Supreme Court for having sought to conceal its own political
preferences behind a facade of formalistic reasoning and thus for being
hypocritical and uncandid. I shall consider the method by which
Tribe attempts to establish his criticism and his own effort to fill the
chasm that appears if the criticism is accepted and constitutional decisions are judged purely on political grounds.
I

The book has three parts. The first, "The Nature of the Enterprise," explains the author's method, which turns out to be the conscious rejection of method. The brief first chapter sets the tone by
renouncing the quest for postulates or principles of constitutional "interpretation." Text, history, structure, philosophy, and political theory (as distinct from raw political preferences) are all rejected because
"contingency pervades all" (p. 8). Although Tribe says that "constitutional interpretation is a practice alive with choice but laden with content" (p. 4), and that the Constitution is not "infinitely malleable"
(id.), in his hands it is almost that; he recognizes few limits on
"interpretation."
·
'
Chapter Two continues the theme of the first chapter with an attack on John Hart Ely's view that virtually all we need bother about in
• Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer, University of Chicago Law School. - Ed.
I thank Frank Easterbrook, Philip Elman, Richard Levy, Bernard Meltzer, Henry
Monaghan, Helane Morrison, Geoffrey Stone, and Cass Sunstein for their exceedingly helpful
comments on a previous draft, and Levy in addition for his excellent research assistance.
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reading the Constitution is what Ely regards as its latent goal of making the popular branches of government, the legislative and executive
branches, more representative of the full range of outlooks and interests in society. 1 Although Tribe attacks Ely for neglecting the substantive policies in the Constitution, the force of the attack is blunted
by Tribe's implicit belief that those policies do not really originate in
the Constitution but are put there by the observer, the "chooser."
Chapter Three of Tribe's book takes up the matter of amending the
Constitution. This may seem unrelated to interpreting the existing
Constitution, but amending and construing are much the same thing
to Tribe. Both are arenas of "constitutional choice," and, for him,
choices of the same character. Thus he advances the startling proposition, one consistent with his view of the Constitution's plasticity but
without basis in the language or history of the Constitution, that an
amendment might be unconstitutional merely because of a lack of "fit"
with the existing Constitution. "An amendment prohibiting atheists
from holding federal office, for example, would clash with the current
Constitution's paramount concern for freedom of conscience no less
than a statute to the same effect would run counter to the current
Establishment Clause." 2 Tribe rightly adds, however, that the courts
should not pass on the constitutionality of amendments, as that
"would unequivocally subordinate the amendment process to the legal
system it is intended to override and would thus gravely threaten the
integrity of the entire structure'~ (p." 27).
This part of the book ends with a chapter on how courts should
treat omissions in constitutional and statutory enactments. The chapter contains an interesting discussion of the steel seizure case3 and little with which to disagree. A competent discussion of some technical
problems of interpreting enactments, it shows that Professor Tribe has
1. See J. HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
(1980).
2. P. 25 (emphasis added, and - a qualification I shall not repeat - end notes omitted).
Although there are no footnotes, the 159 pages of end notes take up more than a third of the
entire book. Many notes take up more than a half page of fine print; some as much as a page and
a half. There are 1829 notes in all, which means that to read the notes together with the perti·
nent text the reader must flip to the back of the book an average of seven times for every page of
text read. What a chore it was!
Publishers prefer end notes to footnotes because they are cheaper and enable the book to be
produced faster. But having published two books in recent years with the publisher of Co11stitu·
tio11a/ Choices (Harvard University Press), both with footnotes rather than end notes, I can tes·
tify that this publisher's policy on the matter is not inflexible; and Tribe would have been well
advised to insist on footnotes. Yet if his notes had been printed as footnotes, each page of the
book would be (on average) less than two-thirds text and more than one-third footnotes, and the
reader would be spending too much time interrupting his reading of the text to read footnotes often long and dense textual footnotes. (There would be less interruption than if the render had
to flip to the back of the book every time he hit a note, but there would still be too much.) There
is something more deeply wrong with Tribe's notes than their location. I shall have more to say
about the style of the book in Part III of this review.
3. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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lawyerly skills, as his other writings, and his success as a practitioner
of constitutional law, also sbow. The is~ue, we shall see, is whether
such skills are alone enough to fashion a constitutional philosophy.
But I find much to agree with in Part I. The problem is that one
comes out of Part I and plunges into the consideration of specific doctrines without knowing what Tribe's own approach is to be. The approach of not taking an approach is not illuminating.
Part II addresses various topics in the allocation of powers within
the federal government and between that government and state government. Chapter Five (the first chapter in this part) argues the unconstitutionality of legislative proposals to withdraw the Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction over types of cases offensive to the proponents - such as abortion and school prayer cases. Tribe argues
that the proposals he discusses (some of which may have been intended more as attention-getting gestures than as practical proposals)
would circumvent the procedure for amendment set forth in the Constitution and violate the provision in article III ordaining a supreme
court. Here, as in Tribe's discussion of the justiciability of constitutional amendments, the reader might think himself in the presence of a
conventional constitutional analyst who derives modest conclusions
from the text and structure of the Constitution. Not so; read on.
Chapters Six and Seven attack two recent decisions of the Supreme
Court - the Marathon 4 and Chadha 5 decisions, the first holding that
bankruptcy judges had been given certain powers in violation of article
III, the second that the legislative veto violated articles I and II. Tribe
makes several good lawyerly points about these decisions, but the
points show only that better opinions could have been written in defense of the Court's results; they do not show why Tribe disagrees with
the results. But he does, and the reason seems to be that the cases
invalidate "political and institutional innovation[s] of the sort that
may well be essential to the functioning of an ambitious government"
(p. 85). The separation of powers in the Constitution was designed for
a much smaller government, not for the welfare state; therefore the
Constitution must be read flexibly if it is not to limit the growth of the
federal government. Tribe does not pause to consider, however,
whether we are better off or worse off with a big federal government not merely a bigger government than we had in 1787, which is inevitable, but the giant government we have today - though he plainly
thinks we are on the whole better off. Nor does he ask whether, if we
are better off with a giant government, this might nevertheless be the
type of good thing that requires a constitutional amendment to obtain.
Tribe appears to believe that every good thing already is in the Consti4. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
5. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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tution, 6 which means, can be put there by judges "interpreting" its
provisions. But this is assumed rather than argued.
And here we come close to the essential weakness of Tribe's
method. He is good at demonstrating logical flaws in judicial opinions, but all that such a demonstration accomplishes is to knock out
the opinion; it does not show that the result is wrong. Tribe writes as
if showing that a particular decision is badly reasoned establishes that
the opposite decision would have been correct.
This is further illustrated in the next chapter (Chapter Eight),
where Tribe discusses standing to sue. He casts his discussion in the
form of a diatribe against the Lyons1 decision, where the Supreme
Court held that the victim of a policeman's "choke hold" lacked
standing to seek an injunction against the practice. Tribe contrasts
Lyons with Duke Power, 8 where (he argues) the Supreme Court
brushed aside a more serious problem of standing to sue in order to
reach the merits and affirm the constitutionality of the limitations in
the Price-Anderson Act on tort damages for nuclear reactor accidents.9 The contrast between these decisions typifies for Tribe the dishonesty and class bias of today's Supreme Court, which Tribe thinks
uses the doctrine of standing opportunistically, on the one hand to
deny a legal remedy to a poor black man brutalized by the police and
on the other hand to uphold a subsidy for big business. The contrast is
overdrawn. Lyons had a remedy: damages. So would any other
chokehold victim. The question was whether Lyons could also get an
injunction, though it would be of very little benefit to him as he was
unlikely to be subjected to a chokehold again. The denial of an injunction could have been upheld on the basis of standard principles of equitable relief, without reference to the constitutional doctrine of
standing.
In any event, the cases that Tribe has chosen to discuss are not
representative of the Supreme Court's recent decisions on standing. 10
6. Henry P. Monaghan effectively criticizes this position in Our Perfect Co11stitutio11, 56
N.Y.U. L. REV. 353 (1981), as conflating politics and constitutional law.
1: City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
8. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
9. Tribe is not alone in the view that Duke Power presented a serious problem of standing.
See G. ROBINSON, E. GELLHORN & H. BRUFF, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 229 (2d ed.
1980), which contrasts the upholding of standing in that case with the denial of standing in two
cases where low income persons or their representatives were the plaintiffs: Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490 (1975), and Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
10. To correct the balance, see Secretary of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S.
947, 954-59 (1984); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev.
Commn., 461 U.S. 190, 199-203 (1983); Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982);
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., 452 U.S. 264, 297 (1981); Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 380 n.6 (1978); Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 6 n.7 (1977); Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Rous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 260-64 (1977). Havens, involving the standing of black "testers" to complain about racial discrimination even though they
weren't in the market for housing, and Village of Arlington Heights, involving a challenge to a
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And while making clear that he thinks the requirement of standing
should be relaxed, Tribe does not explain why it should be relaxed,
whether this can properly be done without amending article III, how
far he would go in relaxing the requirement, or what the impact on the
workload of the federal courts would be of a minimal standing doctrine, consistently applied. So again he scores lawyer's points but does
not lay a foundation for his own position.
As a critic, Tribe is open to several criticisms besides bias in the
selection of cases to discuss. He criticizes only decisions he deems
conservative. For example, a decision cutting back slightly on the
minimalist doctrine of standing is criticized, but the decisions that created that doctrine in the first place are not. It seems that if a decision
is politically "correct," Tribe will forgive its technical shortcomings.
Furthermore, the majority opinions of the Supreme Court are such
large targets for technical criticisms that the sense of decency that restrains a sportsman from shooting fish in a barrel should restrain the
critic from attacking the Court as fiercely as Tribe does. To secure a
majority, a Justice must persuade four other Justices to join his opinion. To do that he may have to make compromises that reduce the
opinion's intellectual integrity. The alternative is to condemn the bar
and the lower courts to the frustrating labor of trying to extract a
majority position from the intersection of a plurality opinion with a
concurring opinion(s). The Justice who opts for compromise and consensus should ordinarily be forgiven the unavoidable intellectual untidiness of the opinion. A more important point - for my impression is
that relatively few majority opinions in the Supreme Court are in fact
the product of hard-fought compromise, that the spirit of compromise
is not strong in the modem Court - the Court has so vast a jurisdiction that no Justice can hope to have the same knowledge of particular
fields of law as a professor specializing in one or two fields has. A
judicial opinion should not read like, and should not be read like, a
law review article.
The next chapter of Tribe's book, Chapter Nine, deals with federalism, but turns out to be narrowly focused on a few decisions, mainly
National League of Cities v. Usery 11 (which held that the federal minimum wage law could not constitutionally be applied to state government employees), and the cases following it. On the purposes and
proper dimensions of federalism Tribe has little to say, but given his
enthusiasm for centralized government I was surprised to find even
qualified approval of the doctrine of National League of Cities, whose
zoning ordinance as being racially exclusionary, are particularly good counterexamples to Tribe's
picture of a Supreme Court determined to manipulate the doctrine of standing to produce politically conservative outcomes.
11. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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overruling12 coincided with the publication of the book. The form of
the doctrine that he approves (or should I say, approved) is, however,
extremely narrow:
It may be virtually impossible to halt the erosion of state sovereignty
caused by preemptive federal legislation, because the Supremacy Clause
is essential to our federal system of government; national cohesion and
national policy coherence demand it. But we surely can avoid insulting
the states by ordering them about like so many federal bureaucratic lackeys when the federal constitutional rights of individuals are not at stake.
[p. 131]

So it comes down to avoiding "condescension" (id.), which isn't much;
and given Tribe's broad conception of "the federal constitutional
rights of individuals" (of which more shortly), the qualification in the
subordinate clause ("when the constitutional rights of individuals are
not at stake") overwhelms the assertion in the main clause.
This chapter also criticizes - and cogently, too - the Supreme ·
Court's decisions applying the Sherman Act to local but not state government. Tribe argues that the internal allocation of state powers is
no business of the federal government "when the federal constitutional
rights of individuals are not at stake" - a vital qualification, as we
shall see. In this area, too, the rapid evolution of legal doctrine is
overtaking Tribe's discussion.13
The last two chapters in Part II deal with highly specialized
problems, growing out of Tribe's extensive consulting practice, in the
application of constitutional doctrine to regional banking pacts and
the issuance of bonds by American overseas possessions, respectively.
Limitations of space move me to skip them 14 and come directly to Part
III, "The Structure of Substantive Rights." Here Tribe puts forth a
very expansive conception of civil rights and civil liberties. 15 He
thinks that as interpreted by the Supreme Court the Constitution is
too protective of the status quo. He regrets for example that the Court
has interpreted the just compensation clause of the fifth amendment to
protect only conventional property interests and not the "new property" - such things as jobs and welfare benefits - that are so important to ordinary people and the poor. In Chapter Thirteen, Tribe
points out that while freedom of speech has been interpreted to protect
the interests of people who have the money to buy advertising - and
12. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985).
13. See Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 105 S. Ct. 1713 (1985).
14. Except to note that again events have overtaken Tribe's discussion: Northeast Bancorp,
Inc. v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 105 S. Ct. 2545 (1985), though not inconsistent
with Tribe's analysis of regional banking pacts (he argued and won the case), makes the analysis
somewhat academic. Tribe's book is perhaps too topical; it is obsolescing rapidly.
15. A surprising omission from Tribe's discussion of civil liberties, however, is criminal pro·
cedure, a matter on which Tribe feels strongly but which he does not discuss except for passing
references in his discussion of the Lyons decision, and a long and rather angry end note to the
preface. Seep. 271 n.l.
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thus limits on campaign spending by individuals on their own behalf
have been struck down - it has not been interpreted to protect the
interests of those who cannot afford to put postage stamps on their
campaign literature yet have been denied the right to deposit that literature (unstamped) in home letter boxes. Others who substitute personal time for money in the communication of ideas - labor picketers
carrying placards - receive less protection than large corporations,
which can take out full page ads to propagate their views. As with the
just compensation clause, Tribe's answer to the law's tilt toward the
status quo is not to curtail the rights of the wealthy and the established
but to enlarge the rights of the poor and the marginal. That there
might be a collision, since one person's right is another's duty, is not
mentioned.
One form of the status quo that particularly distresses Professor
Tribe is that caused by the physical differences between men and women. The fact that women get pregnant and men don't, a fact that
underlies a variety of traditional laws and practices, is not for Tribe a
legitimate basis for treating men and women differently. Tribe believes that the Constitution should be interpreted to offset such burdens as nature has imposed on women but not on men, even though in
another sense, not considered by Tribe, this would mean treating men
and women differently. If women are biologically vulnerable to particular workplace hazards, this would not for Tribe justify a law forbidding them to be employed where they are exposed to the hazard;
rather, it would mean that they are constitutionally entitled to more
protection than men. The excessively brief chapter in which this position is argued, Chapter Fifteen, is revealingly entitled, "Reorienting
the Mirror of Justice: Gender, Economics, and the Illusion of the
'Natural.' "
The implicit theme of Part III is that the Constitution has (more
precisely, can be given), as a principal goal, compensating for inequalities in wealth and power, however caused. Thus does Tribe, although
opposed to overarching themes of constitutional interpretation, back
into such a theme. As a redistributivist Tribe is led to endorse the
constitutionality of affirmative action (reverse discrimination). But he
does so with a caveat: he admires Justice Powell's opinion in the
Bakke case, 16 rejecting rigid quotas, which in Tribe's view are impolitic and also insufficiently sensitive to people as individuals rather than
as members of racial and other minority groups. Here and in Tribe's
convoluted discussion of the freedom of speech of Nazis (pp. 219-20)
one senses a slight unease with certain aspects of modem liberal
thought. This chapter also endorses the suggestion that the propriety
of affirmative action should depend, in part anyway, on the level of
government that decrees it; the lower, the more suspect. So much for
16. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289 (1978).
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the principle that the internal allocation of functions in state government is not of federal constitutional concern.
The last chapter of Part III challenges the fundamental distinction
in constitutional law between the public and private spheres. In general the Constitution is a charter of negative liberties. It requires government to leave people alone in certain respects but does not tell it to
provide services, correct private wrongs, or bring about a more just
distribution of the world's goods. The due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment, for example, limit only
"state action," not private action. Tribe will not abide the distinction;
it seems to him to ignore "the state's complicity in" "the patterns of
social and economic domination that permeate and in part define our
society" (p. 265). This is strong language. Consider its application to
the Irvis case, 17 where the Supreme Court held that the equal protection clause did not forbid a private club to discriminate against black
people, merely because the state had given the club a license to sell
liquor. Tribe thinks that the plaintiff should have sued the liquor control board rather than the club, so that "he could have directly
charged the board members with suborning racism and aggravating its
impact. by handing out the privilege of a scarce liquor license without
regard to the licensee's racist practices" (p. 255). If licensing the sale
of liquor, as distinct from allowing liquor to be sold without a license,
increased the likelihood of racial discrimination by private clubs, Tribe
would have a point. Maybe some types of regulation do· increase the
likelihood of discrimination, and maybe the idea of state action could
be enlarged to embrace discrimination by firms so regulated. 18 But
Tribe makes no argument along these lines. 19 His position seems to be
that state agencies that have the power to combat racial discrimination
by private persons should not be allowed to take a neutral stance.
They must use their power to forbid those persons to discriminate; the
Constitution imposes an overriding duty on all public officials with an
axe to wield it in such a way as will advance egalitarian ideals. The
reductio ad absurdum of this view is that a minister or rabbi unwilling
to perform mixed marriages should not be licensed to perform any
marriages.
_
If one combines Tribe's view that the Constitution requires government to eliminate natural inequalities with his assault on the "publicprivate" distinction, one has a recipe for rampant judicial activism.
Yet how far he would actually push the logic of his position is unclear.
The chapter on state action is the least coherent in the book. To the
17. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. lrvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
18. See R. POSNER, THE EcONOMICS OF JUSTICE 355-58 (1981).
19. In his treatise on constitutional law he suggests that Irvis might have found it easier to
obtain liquor in nondiscriminatory surroundings ifliquor were unlicensed. See L. TRIBE, AMER·
ICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1173 (1978). No basis for this suggestion is offered.
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radical notion that private prejudice is typically a product of state action ("complicity") - that there is little or no bigotry in the state of
nature - Tribe juxtaposes an imaginatively limited reading of Shelley
v. Kraemer, 20 where the Supreme Court held that a state's judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants violated the equal protection clause. Tribe says that the state refused to enforce most
restrictive covenants, deeming them impermissible restraints on alienation; the decision to enforce racial covenants was thus a decision to
use state power to promote racial segregation. Since the state was
Missouri and the time the 1940s, this is a realistic analysis. But in the
name of "complicity," Tribe apparently is willing to find unconstitutional state involvement in private discrimination where (as in Irvis)
others would find a policy neutral in purpose and effect: a policy not
adopted in order to promote discrimination and unlikely to make it
greater than it otherwise would be.
II

In developing a rationale for.Shelley v. Kraemer, and in his criticisms of specific cases, not all of which I have mentioned, 21 Tribe's
book makes a worthwhile contribution to the literature of constitutional law. But the book aspires to be more than a series of individual
case readings. The fulsome senatorial encomia that decorate the dust
jacket are not likely to have been bestowed as compliments for Professor Tribe's legal analytic powers or individual case readings, but are
more likely to reflect his political slant. In his view (one widely shared
by constitutional scholars at all points of the political compass) every
good thing can be found somewhere in the Constitution; and most of
the good things happen also to be advocated by politicians supported
by Tribe. As Tribe conceives constitutional "interpretation," the Constitution is flexible enough to embrace - to command - a partisan
political position. The most important question about his book is
whether this view is tenable.
I think not; and in fact the view is barely defended, in the book or
anywhere else, which is a clue to its indefensibility. The book is overwhelmingly negative. It attacks; it does not defend. We learn what
are not legitimate sources of constitutional meaning. Text is not.
Constitutional Choices contains few quotations from the Constitution,
an omission that obscures the distance between the actual words of the
document and the meaning Tribe would impress on it. History,
20. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). This reading is foreshadowed in Tribe's treatise. See L. TRIBE, supra
note 19, at 1023. This is true of some other discussions in Constitutional Choices - compare for
example the discussion of the steel seizure case in American Constitutional Law at 181-82 with
the discussion of the same· case in Constitutional Choices at 32-33. For the most part, however,
Constitutional Choices is not a rehash of the earlier book.
21. There is a particularly good discussion ofFERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982). See
pp. 125-32.
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whether in the broad or the narrow ("legislative history") sense, is not
a proper source of constitutional meaning either, for Tribe. He has
virtually nothing to say about history; history might have begun in the
year of Earl Warren's appointment as Chief Justice (the implicit view
of many law students). Therefore the values and intentions of the
framers of the Constitution and its amendments are not significant
sources of constitutional meaning for Tribe. Precedents mean little to
him, too, unless they come from or anticipate the era of expansive
constitutional interpretations that crested between the replacement of
Felix Frankfurter by Arthur Goldberg on the Supreme Court in 1962
and the appointment of Warren Burger in 1969. Any deviation from
the "line" laid down in this era, the heyday of the "Warren Court,"
Tribe deprecates; the line itself he swallows along with hook and
sinker.
Tribe is also against "formalism," the idea that legal outcomes can
be derived by logical deduction from premises external to the judge's
own values and experience. He considers it a technique for concealing
the true grounds of decision in difficult cases. He is also, as we have
seen, against all overarching schemes of constitutional interpretation.
And he is against "technocratic" reasoning, 22 typified by the cost-benefit approach of the economic analysts of law but apparently encompassing all instrumental reasoning. Thus he disagrees that the goal of
legal procedure should be to minimize the sum of the error costs and
avoidance-of-error costs of applying legal sanctions, or even that accuracy should be the overriding goal. He writes, "procedural fairness
reflects the intrinsic value of assuring fair treatment as an individual
and not simply the instrumental value of assuring correct outcomes"
(p. 227; emphasis added). In other words, fairness means being fair.
This is not quite so empty a view as it sounds; if it were, we would
approve of lynching, provided it was clear that the victim of the lynching would have been convicted and executed if spared for trial, and we
don't approve of it. But whether there is as much to the view as Tribe
thinks may be doubted; I shall come back to this point.
There are things that are appealing in Tribe's litany of negations.
Distinguished Supreme Court Justices as otherwise different as John
Marshall and Oliver Wendell Holmes have also believed that the Constitution should, in many of its provisions anyway, be interpreted flexibly, as a document - with the amendments, really a series of
documents - intended to be adaptable to an unforeseeable future.
This view limits (but does not eliminate) the role of text, history, and
22. But not consistently against it. See p. 147 ("Only when the costs may be externalized,
and the benefits internalized, does the Commerce Clause clearly disapprove of self-interested
moves on the part of a state.") Incidentally, the dust jacket and preface describe the book as an
attack on cost-benefit thinking, see p. viii, but in fact this theme rarely appears. But see p. 271
n.l.
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precedent, and makes formalism an unworkable judicial philosophy.23
I even agree with Professor Tribe that the Constitution is not a general
mandate for economic efficiency, though many of its provisions can be
illuminated by economic analysis - among them the commerce
clause, where, it seems to me, Tribe gets into trouble by refusing to
think economically. I shall give just. one example. The judge-made
"market participant" doctrine allows a state engaged in market activities, such as selling cement from a state-owned cement plant, to impose restrictions on itself that would violate the commerce clause if
imposed on private sellers. Tribe defends this result by reference to
the distinction between "creating commerce that would otherwise not
exist" and "merely intruding into a previously existing private market" (p. 146; emphasis in original - as a matter of fact twenty-four
words on this page are italicized for emphasis). But before the state
had a cement plant, there was a market for cement; otherwise the state
would not have built or acquired the plant. By owning such a plant,
the state reduces the private supply of cement; it substitutes a public
for a private market participant. The restrictions it imposes on itself
(e.g., refusing to buy inputs from out of state) are therefore equivalent
to restrictions imposed on the same amount of private supply by a
state that does not participate in the market.
Having stripped away the usual aids to constitutional interpretation, and lacking a taste for political philosophy, Tribe is left with a set
of unexamined political premises to guide the formation of constitutional doctrine. They are not only unexamined; despite Tribe's contempt for judges who (he believes) conceal their class bias and
conservative politics behind a formalist facade, the political character
of his own premises is not acknowledged. He deflects the reader's attention from this omission by making the Supreme Court's decisions
of the 1960s the baseline for normative judgments (without explaining
why) and then criticizing later decisions as reactionary deviations. 24
He criticizes them as illogical and not just politically repulsive deviations, but that angle of attack, as I have suggested, is superficial; to
show that a decision is poorly reasoned does not establish that the
opposite decision would be correct. Many of the decisions he admires
23. Unless (perhaps) a majority of Supreme Court Justices happen to come from identical
backgrounds, both personal and professional. If so, their shared values might provide an adequate set of common premises from which to deduce the outcomes in otherwise indeterminate
cases, and the reign of logic would be preserved. Simpson, The Common Law and Legal TheorJJ,
in OXFORD EsSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 77, 95 (2d ser. A.W.B. Simpson ed. 1973), makes a
similar argument in discussing the cohesiveness of the English common law. But like other
American judges, Supreme Court Justices come from diverse personal and professional
backgrounds.
24. A good example is his use, in Chapter Eight, ofFlast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), as the
baseline for attacking recent decisions on standing to sue. Had Tribe used as his baseline Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), which announced the approach to standing that was
repudiated in Flast over a forceful dissent by Justice Harlan, many of those recent decisions though, admittedly, not Duke Power - would not seem deviant. See notes 9-10 supra.
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were poorly reasoned too. At bottom Tribe is expressing disagreement
with the politics of the current Supreme Court - and distorting those
politics. If Tribe had taken as his baseline the Supreme Court of the
1940s or 1950s - both periods in which the Court's average quality
was as high as at any time since - he would have to regard both the
Earl Warren and the Warren Burger eras as "liberal" deviations. To
think the contemporary Supreme Court a "reactionary" court is to
betray a lack of perspective, as well as to ignore much scholarship to
the contrary. 25
Tribe might answer that the difference between the Warren and
Burger eras that he perceives is not a difference in political orientation
in a narrow partisan sense but a difference in fundamental values. The
Warren Court (Tribe might say) wanted to create a freer, more equal
society; the Burger Court wants to preserve social arrangements that
are unjust, unfree, and unequal. If this were the choice, it would be an
easy one to make. But in adumbrating his "vision of what this country
is about" (p. 357 n.246), Tribe forgets that he is taking sides on burning issues, rather than uttering truisms. Diametrically opposed to the
"liberal" ideology espoused by Tribe is an equally articulate "conservative" ideology with as good a philosophical pedigree as the "liberal"26 and a better historical one from a constitutional standpoint
because it is more in keeping with the values of 1787, 1789, and 1868.
The adherents to this ideology would (improperly in my view) reorient
constitutional law to make it a mandate for economic liberty and a
nemesis of the welfare state. 27 Preoccupied with the modest retrenchments of the Burger Court - ignoring its bold initiatives in abortion,
free speech, and other areas - Tribe overlooks the greater potential
menace to all he holds dear in constitutional analysis that comes from
a point of the political compass far to the right of the current Supreme
Court, and that derives legitimacy from a position, such as Tribe's,
which empties the Constitution of meaning.
Tribe's neglect of all but a narrow segment of political and social
thinking on the issues that he discusses undermines his book at ma~y
points. For example, his position that due process (in the sense of
notice and an opportunity for a hearing) is an unqualified good to be
pursued without regard to costs is made unpersuasive by his refusal to
consider the extensive literature, most of it neither economic nor con25. See, e.g., THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T (Blasi ed.
1983); Gunther, Reflections on the Burger Court, STAN. LAW., Spring 1985, at 5.
26. See, e.g., R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
27. See, e.g., R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN (1985); B. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION (1980); Conant,
Antimonopo/y Tradition Under the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments: Slaughter-House Cases
Re-Examined, 31 EMORY L.J. 785 (1982); Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract
Clause, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 703 (1984); Economic Liberties and the Judiciary, 4 CATO J., 661
(1985). There are ns well a variety of other conservative positions, none of which Tribe discusses.
I mention only the most dramatic contrast to his position.
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servative, that emphasizes the adverse impact on the very people intended to be benefited by the procedural safeguards that Tribe would
see extended -juveniles, the disabled, people on welfare. 28 He also
does not consider whether the poor would actually gain froin an interpretation of the just compensation clause that made welfare a form of
property, given that such an interpretation would make government
reluctant to raise welfare levels, since once raised they could not be
lowered. And he seems unacquainted with the literature on the actual
consequences - inany of them perverse - of welfare rights which he
would constitutionalize. 29 His discussion of policy is, in a word, superficial - a serious weakness in a book that equates constitutional law
with sound social policy.
Tribes treatment of labor picketing, in the chapter on freedom of
speech (pp. 198-203), provides a further illustration of this point. He
considers the application to picketing of the principle that the first
amendment permits the regulation ·of "speech brigaded with action"
an example of the Supreme Court's class-conscious hostility to inexpensive modes of communicating ideas, for he can find no distinction
between picketing and advertising except that the latter costs more.
He ignores the fact that unions are allowed to and do make substantial
political contributions,30 and the fact that picketing is potentially coercive in ways that advertising is not. Even those most friendly to the
union movement, and most hostile to the judicial position on picketing, recognize that picketers are sometimes violent (which means,
often potentially violent) and that picketing enables the identification
of replacement workers and other strikebreakers for future retaliation.31 These are not properties of advertising. It is true that some
people regard advertising as "coercive" in subtler ways, but the same
people are likely to complain - with justification, too - about the
loose use of the word "coercion" in discussions of purely peaceful,
nonretaliatory picketing. 32 It is also true that labor picketing is a lot
more peaceful than it once was; but it could become less peaceful again
28. See, e.g., 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE 495-99 (2d ed. 1979); W. GELLHORN, C, BYSE & p. STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENT 445-51 (7th ed.
1979); J. MASHAW & R. MERRILL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW
SYSTEM: CASES AND COMMENTS 192-94 (2d ed. 1985); Friendly, "Some Kind ofHearing'~ 123
U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1275-77, 1289-91, 1303-04, 1316-17 (1975); Fuerst & Petty, Due ProcessHow Much is Enough?, 79 PUB. INTEREST 96 (1985); Mashaw, The Management Side of Due
Process, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 772 (1974).
29. See, e.g., M. ANDERSON, WELFARE: THE POLITICAL EcONOMY OF WELFARE REFORM
IN THE UNITED STATES 43-58 (1978); B. PAGE, WHO GETS WHAT FROM GOVERNMENT 60-100
(1983) - the former written from a conservative, the latter from a liberal, standpoint.
30. See Pipefitters Local Union No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385 (1972).
31. See, e.g., Note, Peaceful Labor Picketing and the First Amendment, 82 COLUM. L. REV.
1469, 1491 (1982).
32. See, e.g., Jones, Picketing and Coercion: A Jurisprudence of Epithets, 39 VA. L. REV.
1023 (1953).
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if it were wholly free from regulation, as Professor Tribe thinks the
first amendment requires that it be.
There is a more fundamental point. The purpose of labor picketing generally is to increase wages, or economic equivalents such as
fringe benefits. Picketing thus resembles concerted activity by companies to raise prices (or depress wages). 33 Yet even in an era when commercial speech is constitutionally protected, no one thinks the
government cannot forbid cartels just because their members communicate information and opinions on prices and other matters of mutual
concern, either with each other or (to make the analogy to picketing
closer) with consumers, suppliers, and competitors. It is not obvious
that wage-fixing should have a different status under the first amendment from price-fixing. This is another issue that Professor Tribe
ignores.
His suggestions that the recent decline in the percentage of American workers belonging to unions is due to corporations' spending more
than unions on propaganda (p. 202), and that American unions' traditional lack of interest in ideology "has been shaped in large degree by
the Supreme Court itself" (pp. 202-03), are unsupported and implausible. And his failure to mention the severe restrictions that the National Labor Relations Board has imposed, and the Supreme Court
has upheld, on employers' freedom of speech34 leaves the reader in the
dark about Tribe's view of what the first amendment should mean in
the labor field. It also illustrates Tribe's selective use of legal doctrine
to support his thesis about the political character of the current
Supreme Court. By avoiding mention of the Supreme Court's refusal,
in the teeth of the statute, 35 to give employers the same rights of free
speech that the Court has given the Communist Party, Tribe avoids
having to confront a conspicuous contradiction of his thesis that the
Court is a right-wing institution.

III
Tribe's policy choices seem based on will and emotion rather than
evidence and logic. Maybe this is true for everyone, but not everyone
is so eager to impose his choices on the community. Further evidence
of the emotional and egoistic character of Tribe's constitutionalism is
the book's overripe, immodest, and opaque style. Here is one example: "If I succeed in evaporating a cloud here or a mist there and, thus,
in displaying more lucidly a broader span of the constitutional horizon
33. See Posner, Some Economics of Labor Law, 51 U. Cm. L. REV. 988 (1984).
34. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969), and for criticism Getman, Labor
Law and Free Speech: The Curious Policy of Limited Expression, 43 Mo. L. REV. 4 (1984).
35. See section 8(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(c);
NLRB v. Golub Corp., 388 F.2d 921, 926-28 (2d Cir. 1967) (Friendly, J.).
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and its curvature, this volume will have achieved most of what I hoped
to accomplish by writing it" (p. x). Here is another:
Publishing these essays in the meantime [pending revision of his 1978
treatise on constitutional law, wh~ch he describes as "a more global effort: it was an attempt to roll the constitutional universe into a ball and
show it as a unified whole"], rather than reducing and polishing them
into pieces of that more comprehensive later work, has been a liberation
for me. I would not wish to squirrel the essays away until they can be
folded into a larger study, one in which they fit elegantly but no longer
reflect my freshest thoughts on the issues they seek to treat. I would
rather publish them now - rough edges only partly trimmed and links
only tentatively forged:-- in the season of their completion. [p. x].

This is awfully plummy prose ("season of completion," etc.), written
by someone who takes himself awfully seriously; and it does not make
much sense, either. Since many of the essays published in this book
had been published previously in law reviews or elsewhere, the choice
was not between collecting them in a book and "squirrel[ing] them
away." And why should a reader want Professor Tribe's "freshest"
thoughts, unmatured by reflection? Do they stale so quickly?
Several other characteristics of Tribe's style also deserve attention
for the light they cast on his method of constitutional argument:
1. Excessive use of italics is one. I mentioned a page on which
twenty-four words are italicized for emphasis; 36 on another page I
counted twenty-five (p. 43). Here is one sentence from a different
page:
In short, remembering that it is an amendment to the Constitution we
are considering may be almost as important as remembering that it is a
Constitution we are, in the end, amending and construing - and remembering that, because neither process may be emptied of substance or subjectivity, both must engage the judiciary in a more candid and
collaborative way than the pretense of proceduralism permits. [p. 28]

Notice, besides the italics, the excessive alliteration ("substance or subjectivity," "candid and collaborative," "pretense of proceduralism permits"), the filler words ("almost," "in the end"), the apparent lack of a
verb to go with the third "remembering that," which makes the sentence collapse - and the incongruous "In short" which introduces the
sentence.
2. Professor Tribe's writing is plethoric. In the following sentence
I have bracketed the words that could be eliminated without loss of
meaning:
At stake in [any] such response - particularly if it becomes a [more or
less] common reaction to constitutional rulings that [seriously] displease
a [popular] majority that finds itself not quite able to overturn them by
amendment - is [nothing less than] the survival of a distinctly Ameri36. See text following note 23 supra.
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can institution, that of review of legislative and executive action by an
independent judiciary [entrusted to enforce the Constitution]. [p. 48]

Take away the superfluous words and you will realize how little is
being said. Notice also the use of "distinctly" where Tribe means
"distinctively.'_'37
3. Tribe is too fond of metaphor, as in "disarmed, disembodied
oracle" (p. 53), "increasingly slender reed" (p. 358 n.250), and the
"mythical" [was there, as Herodotus thought, a real?] "Sword of
Damocles" that, all on one page (p. 49), hangs, is tested, then falls then, in most un-Damoclean fashion, is fallen on - and the author
wonders whether the Supreme Court would "take the blow lying
down." He makes metaphor a substitute for analysis, as when he says
of the anti-abortionists that they would "conscript women . . . as involuntary incubators" (p. 243), "foster involuntary servitude" (p.
244), and make women "donate their bodies to their unborn children"
(id.). These are arresting (if derivative38) ways of characterizing the
anti-abortionists' position, but they create a rhetoric of emotion rather
than of meaning. Does Tribe really take these metaphors seriously?
Consider the "incubator" metaphor. An incubator does not contribute anything to the genetic makeup of the baby. It is thus an impoverished metaphor fo! a mother. Tribe gives no evidence of being willing
actually to think about the abortion controversy.
4. Legal and academic jargon, "with-it" cliches, and dense
nominalizations give the book an air that Tribe might if more selfaware have called "technocratic," as in "delineate the perimeter which
circumscribes" (p. 123 - meaning, "describe"), "manipulable bomagain Contract Clause analysis" (p. 182), "mechanical gender-based
classifications" (p. 224), 39 "suitably sequenced combination of two different lenses" (p. 248), "Close-Focus Lense: Looking for a Nexus" (p.
249). The last phrase is a subtitle. The titles and subtitles are awful.
37. Other, less serious because more common, solecisms are the "hoi polloi," p. 186, and
"schizophrenic," p. 195. "Hoi" is the Greek masculine plural nominative article, "the"; "the hoi
polloi," the form used by Tribe, means "the the many." "Schizophrenia" is psychosis; it is not
the condition in which one has trouble making up one's mind or acts inconsistently - the latter
being Tribe's meaning. Of course this is a very common mistake; I'm sure I have made it. But
he underscores it by saying, "The response of the Court may be described, without exaggeration,
as schizophrenic." "[W]ithout exaggeration" is, to anyone who knows what "schizophrenia"
really means, a comical exaggeration.
38. See, e.g., Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47 (1971).
39. The use of "gender" for "sex,'' and the addition of a superfluous "-based" to words like
"gender" and (in first amendment law) "content,'' are among the uglier bits of contemporary
legal jargon. One might expect academics, at least, to eschew them. One might also expect
academics to avoid false antitheses ("For a doctrine in its infancy, commercial speech has
demonstrated remarkable vigor,'' p. 211 - as if infants typically lacked vigor), as well as such
gobbledygook as: "In short, the Court indulged in a shell game, first throwing out a circular
definition of the limited public forum, then trying to break the circle by noting the acceptability
of subject-matter restrictions, and, finally, proceeding to apply minimal scrutiny to alleged viewpoint discrimination,'' p. 207.
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These faults of style may be accidents of haste or carelessness, 40
but they are not unrelated to the book's substance. They pad and bedazzle, and if one stripped them away one would lay bare a slim and
unimpressive substance, the literary counterpart to a shaven Persian
cat. Also, a writer's style indicates, if not always the quality of his (or
her) thought, always the character of his culture. Despite Tribe's antagonism to "technocracy," he himself is not, on the evidence of this
book anyway, a person steeped in the humanities. This would not be
important if he did not present himself to the reader as a defender of
traditional culture against economists and other "technocrats," or if
he did not claim to be expounding a new constitutional philosophy. It
is his ambition to shape and direct constitutional thinking along new
paths that draws the reader's attention to the poverty of his style and
to the fact that those 1829 end notes contain few references to the
world of thought that exists outside of recent Supreme Court opinions
(many drafted by twenty-five-year-old law clerks fresh out of law
school) and the professional commentary on them.
So, to complete the list of the things that this book is not, it is not a
book by someone who brings to the study of law a perspective beyond
that of the intelligent legal practitioner equipped only with the lawyer's technical skills. I do not mean to denigrate those skills, which
are essential to constitutional reasoning and enable Tribe to offer some
shrewd analyses of individual cases. Only they do not, standing all by
themselves, enable him, or anyone, to construct a system of constitutional law. A person who knows only what is in cases is not equipped
to make fundamental social choices for us. If Tribe knew more, he
would be less confident that he could make such choices correctly.
Activism begins in ignorance.
And yet Professor Tribe is, if perhaps not as the dust jacket says
the nation's leading scholar and practitioner of constitutional law, certainly a prominent one. The failure of the book is a failure not of a
person but of a method; and the method is to use the skills of a lawyer
to make political choices for society in the name of a fictive constitution, as if the Supreme Court really were a superlegislature and government by lawyers had, at last, arrived. 41 The failure is a particularly
striking one because Tribe disparages the tradition of legal analysis at
the same time that he wields its tools. He faults the Supreme Court
for illogic and uncandor, often effectively, yet at the same time sug40. Tribe's constitutional law treatise, supra note 19, is much better written· than Constitutional Choices. On the relationship of bad writing to bad thinking see, e.g., George Orwell's
classic essay Politics and the English Language (widely reprinted); S. CHASE, THE TYRANNY OF
WORDS (1938); G. KRESS & R. HODGE, LANGUAGE AS IDEOLOGY (1979).
41. See Professor (now Judge) Easterbrook's recent reply to an article by Tribe: Easterbrook, Method, Result, and Authority: A Reply, 98 HARV. L. REV. 622, 627-29 (1985), criticizing Tribe, Constitutional Calculus: Equal Justice or Economic Efficiency?, 98 HARV. L. REV. 592
(1985).
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gests that the test of constitutional doctrine is not its craftsmanship
but its political soundness - that the question is not how good a court
the Supreme Court is but how good a legislature.
He does not defend this view, so I shall not bother to attack it
beyond remarking that although it is inevitable that judges will have
political views, it is not inevitable that judges will use them to thwart
the political decisions of the elected branches of government. Judging
and legislating were not meant to be identical. The failure to appreciate this rather elementary point is the fatal, though not the only, flaw
of this book.
The Supreme Court is a committee of lawyers, appointed for life,
who are on average no wiser or humbler than Professor Tribe, except
insofar as age and institutional responsibility create wisdom and
humility in some. For the sake of social peace and stability, let us
hope that the Court, whatever the politics of its members, will always
hesitate more than the author of Constitutional Choices hesitates to
translate personal political preferences into constitutional imperatives.

